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trap early in the reconstruction period, and entered a cyclical crisis in 1998 which resulted 
from an ill-designed fiscal-monetary policy mix. The expansionary fiscal policy resulting 
from the high resource demands – due to economic and political reconstruction and from 
the needs of addressing horizontal inequality codified in the peace agreement known as the 
Taef Accords – led to a fiscal crisis of the state. The monetary and central bank policy was 
finance-biased with emphasis on financial and exchange rate stability and foreign capital 
inflows. Such a mix led to a real interest rate shock in the postwar period that played a role 
in the onset of the cyclical downturn. The finance-biased policy led to the rise of a rentier 
economy leading to deindustrialization during this period. The rise of a growth-impeding 
political economic structure resulting from the Taef Accords also played a role in 
intensifying the economic crisis through exerting pressures on public resources and through 
the engendering of a political crisis that brought to an end the era of postwar reconstruction. 
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1 Introduction 
The Lebanese civil war lasted more than 15 years from April 1975 to October 1990. In 
terms of its ranking amongst interstate and civil wars that the world has witnessed since 
the end of the Second World War, it was one of the major wars of the late twentieth 
century.1 The consequences of the civil war were highly devastating to the functioning 
of the small open and liberal economy that Lebanon enjoyed before 1975. The effects of 
the war can be summarized in the following. First, the Lebanese economy’s lost output 
was estimated at US$24 billion in 1986 (Saidi 1999). In 1990, the GDP per capita was 
less than one third of the GDP per capita in 1974 at the eve of the war. Second, the 
economy experienced a massive destruction of capital stock. It is estimated that the 
physical assets destroyed during the war are around US$25 billion (Gressani and Page 
1999). Third, Lebanon suffered from the loss of human resources through war casualties 
and emigration. War related deaths are estimated at 131,000 (Uppsala Conflict 
Database) while emigration is put at around 500,000. Fourth, there was a deterioration 
of the infrastructure of the economy; mainly the electricity, telephone, water and road 
networks. Fifth, the negative productivity shock and the inflationary crisis of the 1980s 
led to massive redistribution of income and factor shares. The prewar wage share which 
reached 50-55 per cent was reduced to 15-25 per cent by the end of the war. Sixth, the 
war caused a weakening of state institutions including the military, security forces, 
administrative capacities and especially revenue generating capabilities and resource 
mobilization. Seventh, the war led to the destruction of communities through the 
massive displacement of population especially in Mount Lebanon and the South. 
The hostilities ended in October 1990 with the implementation of the Taef Accords 
which redistributed political power amongst the different Lebanese sects and 
constituencies. The period between 1990 and 1992 was mainly a period of political 
reconstruction which included the reestablishment of Lebanese political, military, 
security and administrative capabilities. In 1992, a new government took power headed 
by Rafic Hariri, a Lebanese business man, which started a new era in postwar 
reconstruction. The government immediately set at devising an economic reconstruction 
plan aptly called ‘Horizon 2000’. This ambitious plan consisted of an investment 
expenditures programme and corresponding macroeconomic targets from 1993 to 2007. 
In addition to the plan, the government undertook the task of macroeconomic and 
financial stabilization that aimed at controlling inflation and the recurrent currency 
crises which plagued the economy during the later phase of the civil war (post 1984) 
and during the early period of peace form 1990 to 1992. Financial and exchange rate 
stability were considered essential for the attraction of foreign capital for the 
reconstruction programme. The government and the central bank chose to use the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor in the postwar stabilization period.2 This duality of 
                                                 
1  In comparison to seventy nine wars that Koubi (2005) studied, Lebanon’s war indicators are 
consistently above the mean except for intensity. The indicators for Lebanon are: battle deaths 
(131,000), battle deaths per 100,000 (4366), duration of war (186 months), battle-deaths per month 
(705). The means for the indicators are 101839, 79.4, 63.72 and 6297.9 respectively for wars between 
1960 and 1989. 
2   The nominal exchange rate was chosen as an anchor in the postwar period (versus choosing money 
supply) because of high currency substitution and dollarization. The endogeneity of money supply 
relevant to the determination of the price level and output as a result of foreign currency deposits 
makes the control over money supply highly uncertain (Bhattacharya 2003).   2
postwar reconstruction and macroeconomic stabilization formed the basis of the policies 
of the successive Hariri governments until 1998. In addition to the plan and the set of 
policy initiatives, Rafic Hariri was seen as a symbol of the resurrection of Lebanon. The 
Hariri clout was so overwhelming that he projected an internal and external image of a 
country that is rising from the ashes: a kind of media generated ‘Phoenix factor’ that 
even won appraise from the president of the World Bank James Wolfensohn during his 
visit to Beirut in June 1997 despite internal criticisms at the plan and fiscal 
developments at the time (Corm 1998).  
Postwar economy in Lebanon passed through four stages. The first phase (growth cycle) 
from 1992 to 1998 was the period of postwar reconstruction boom. The Hariri 
governments were able to sustain economic growth boosted by renewed confidence in 
the economy, high current and capital public expenditures and a stable macroeconomic 
environment. However, the boom was inherently unstable given high government 
deficits and the exchange rate based stabilization. The period ended with a recession in 
a typical Exchange Rate Based Stabilization (ERBS) boom and bust. The second phase 
(crisis I) came about as a result of the election of the army chief General Emile Lahoud 
to the presidency and the formation of a new government headed by Selim Hoss, an 
economist and veteran politician. The new government held anti-Hariri views especially 
on the direction of reconstruction and the state of public finances. The government 
formulated an austerity and stabilization plan that aimed at stopping the growth of 
public deficit and debt. The plan was never implemented and the economic crisis 
deepened given that there was a significant loss in confidence on the part of the 
consumers and investors. The government lost the parliamentary elections of 2000 that 
brought Rafic Hariri back to power in a landslide victory. The new phase in the 
economy of the postwar period (crisis II), despite the return of Hariri to power, signalled 
a further deepening of the crisis from a cyclical crisis to a more structural crisis. It was 
clear that by that time the reconstruction programme as envisaged by the Horizon 2000 
plan was long considered to be over. The country was faced with a deepening structural 
crisis that threatened to undo most of the achievements of the postwar period. The 
economy was on the brink of deflation. The political crisis had three dimensions. First, 
cracks in the relationship between the different sects started brewing as a result of the 
fiscal crisis of the state and its inability to continue siphoning state resources to the 
various distributional channels that were established in the post 1992 period. By 2001, 
the internal political conflict was leading to economic crisis signalling the end of the 
Second Republic distributional system. The second dimension took a more nationalist 
and to a certain extent anti-Taef Accords. The period witnessed the beginning of a 
budding anti-Syrian national movement comprised of the Qornet Chehwan grouping of 
Christian political parties and figures established in April 2001, the Aounist Free 
Patriotic Movement and the left. This ushered in a new period of political crisis. The 
third dimension of the political crisis involved a continuous struggle for power between 
the President of the Republic Emile Lahoud and the all powerful prime minister Rafic 
Hariri. This power struggle impeded the proper functioning of the state institutions and 
most importantly the executive branch of government. The crisis threatened the 
economy with total collapse. The prime minister went for a foreign aid solution that 
would postpone the collapse of the economy and strengthen his position vis-à-vis the 
president. The Paris II meetings were held in November 2002 with an impressive show 
of support from major governments and international organizations. The Paris II 
agreement brought US$3.1 billion in pledges from international participants including 
France. This averted an impending financial crisis and led to the return of confidence   3
and trust in the Lebanese economy producing a recovery period in 2003. However, the 
political crisis intensified, and ended in the assassination of Rafic Hariri and the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005. 
This paper argues that postwar reconstruction in Lebanon has failed to achieve its initial 
ambitious objectives. Unlike the post-conflict historical experiences of countries with an 
initial state of massive destruction of capital stock and physical assets, the Lebanese 
economy experienced what can be called a ‘growth trap’ early on in the reconstruction 
phase. The reconstruction boom lasted only up until 1998. The reasons for such a failure 
are multifaceted and reside in a badly designed fiscal policy, a finance-biased monetary 
and central bank policy and a political economic structure that was growth-impeding. 
Fiscal policy was driven by both political and economic reconstruction objectives and 
needs. This entailed huge government expenditures in the postwar period creating 
chronic budget deficits as a result of lagging revenues generated in part by a supply-side 
tax reform in 1993 that reduced income taxes. Monetary and central bank policy, on the 
other hand, had a sole objective of maintaining exchange rate stability, low inflation and 
capital inflows all deemed necessary for the success of the reconstruction process. This 
monetary-fiscal policy mix led to a finance-biased economy with high real interest rates 
which caused the end of the reconstruction boom phase by 1998. Moreover, this 
economic policy mishap was part of a larger political-economic structure that was 
established in the postwar period. A postwar political and distributive coalition was 
created in Lebanon that acted as a fetter on economic growth. The Taef Accords, being 
a grand scheme of consensus building amongst the sects in Lebanon, led to massive 
expenditures on state building, massive expenditures on addressing horizontal inequities 
amongst regions and sects and to political deadlock, foreign hegemony and sectarian 
conflict that caused in part the collapse of economic growth in the postwar period. In a 
sense, it can be said that costs of ‘political reconstruction’ played a role in the undoing 
of economic reconstruction.  
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 discusses the economic recovery plan and the 
postwar record on economic growth and distributional developments. Section 3 
overviews fiscal developments. Section 4 presents the role of the central bank in 
developing the finance-biased economy generated by state-central bank-commercial 
bank collusion. Section 5 discusses the political economy of ‘political reconstruction’ 
engendered by the Taef Accords. Section 6 presents concluding remarks that draw 
lessons from the Lebanese experience.  
2  The economic recovery plan 
The reconstruction programme went through different reincarnations between 1993 and 
1995. Early in 1992, a National Emergency Reconstruction Plan (NERP) was quickly 
devised by the newly revived Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR). The 
NERP was a short-term physical and social infrastructure rehabilitation plan with a cost 
of US$2.25 billion (Wetter 1999). The plan was then subsequently revised and 
expanded to become a full fledged long-term investment plan that included 
macroeconomic projections of GDP and GDP per capita growth, fiscal developments 
and internal and external financing needs. The plan was called Horizon 2000. The 
Horizon 2000 plan envisaged spending around US$18 billion on public and social 
infrastructure over a span of 13 years from 1995 to 2007. The sectoral composition of   4
reconstruction investment was distributed are presented in Table 1.3 Moreover the plan, 
based on historical data, assumed that public investment will be matched on a three to 
one basis by private investments in equipment and building structures. The plan 
projected that GDP growth over the period would average 8 per cent a year which 
would double GDP per capita by the end of 2007 (Alfazlaka 1995).4 The plan is largely 
now forgotten and it had a life span of around four years that ended with the election of 
Emile Lahoud in 1998 and the exit of Hariri from government. 
 
Table 1 
Sectoral shares in the Horizon 2000 plan 
 
Sector Share  (%) 
Physical infrastructure (electricity, telecoms, roads, highways)  37 
Social infrastructure (education, health, social affairs)  25 
Public services (water, wastewater, public transport)  22 
Productive sectors (irrigation, oil, airport, ports)  8 
State apparatus (buildings, administration, information)  8 
Source: Wetter (1999). 
                                                 
3   In addition to the massive economic reconstruction programme, the government had plans for the 
physical reconstruction of the Beirut Central District (BCD) and the rehabilitation of the Northern and 
Southern Suburbs of Beirut. The BCD was almost totally destroyed during the civil war and the 
suburbs (especially the Southern suburbs) were debilitated in terms of housing, infrastructure and 
social services due to years of neglect, war and internal migration. The reconstruction of the BCD was 
awarded to a private company Solidere which appropriated private lands and deeds. The cost was 
estimated at US$4.2 billion. The project is well underway and considered by many as the jewel of 
postwar reconstruction. The other two reconstruction projects were largely forgotten due to lack of 
funding and political disputes. The development of the Northern suburbs LINORD was a massive land 
reclamation and urban development project located on 2.4 million square meters with a total cost of 
US$550 million. The development of the Southern suburbs under the title Elyssar was envisaged as a 
massive development resident reallocation and infrastructure rehabilitation urban project. The 
company Elyssar was established but the project never saw the light of day. The project was seen at 
times as a threat to the influence of Hezbollah in the suburbs.  
4   A back of the envelope calculation shows that the government was not widely off the margin in its 
prediction of 8 per cent real GDP growth. Public infrastructure has been shown to lead to increases in 
productivity. According to various studies reported by the World Bank (1994), the rate of return, as 
measured by the percentage increase in output as a result of 1 per cent change in infrastructure level, 
varies from 0.5-0.9 per cent depending on the country and type of project. Moreover, De Long and 
Summers (1992) estimated that every 1 percentage point increase in the equipment investment/GDP 
ratio is associated with an increase of about 0.20 to 0.35 percentage points in the growth rate of GDP 
per worker. Given these results, it is safe to assume that Lebanon will experience a tremendous growth 
in productivity over the years of the Horizon 2000 plan. The annual permanent investment boost to 
investment is almost 12 per cent of the GDP over the course of 13 years. If we assume that the social 
rate of return of this public investment is 30 per cent per year, which is less than the average of rates 
of returns of various public investment projects studied by the World Bank (1994), and that the rate of 
depreciation of public capital stock is 5 per cent then the increase in productivity per year as a result 
of the NERP over 13 years will be a 6 per cent permanent boost to annual output per year. According 
to De Long and Summers (1992), a 1 per cent permanent boost to equipment investment will result in 
a (r + δ)/δT per cent boost to the growth of output over a T-year period where r = annual rate of return 
and δ = depreciation rate.   5
During its lifetime, the plan initially met political opposition from the parliament. The 
Horizon 2000 plan which was presented to the parliament as part of the 1995 budget 
was sidelined to be approved on a project by project basis. Given the plan’s composition 
as a series of projects rather than a comprehensive development or reconstruction plan, 
this political opposition did not dent the plan and it was overcome by Hariri through the 
formation of his second government in 1995. However, the main problems for the plan 
were fiscal. By 1996 and in response to a critical confidential World Bank report that 
criticized government finances and had gloomy future projections, the government 
reduced the total amount to be spent in the years 1993-2002 to US$7 billion in contrast 
to the initially estimated US$13 billion (Lebanon Report 1996). Despite such 
difficulties, the plan and the successive Hariri governments did actually spend massive 
amounts on reconstruction during the period 1993-98. By the end of 1998, CDR 
ongoing and completed projects totalled US$4.25 billion (Wetter 1999).5 Moreover, the 
level of capital expenditures in 1992-98 was high. Table 2 presents capital expenditures 
for the period showing high levels compared to average capital expenditures in a sample 
of 25 industrial and developing countries in the period 1991-95 which was 3.7 per cent 
of GDP (Helbling 1999). 
Table 2 
Public capital expenditures (1993-98) 






Source: Helbling (1999). 
2.1 Economic  growth 
Given such an ambitious reconstruction plan and high levels of capital expenditures 
how did the Lebanese economy perform in the postwar period? The experiences of 
postwar reconstruction booms especially after conflicts that result in the destruction of 
capital stock and physical assets would predict that Lebanon should experience a similar 
boom. However, postwar growth in Lebanon was less than spectacular and the economy 
soon entered into a growth cycle and the long run record, measured over ten years, was 
dismal by postwar growth standards. 
2.1.2 Postwar growth: historical experience 
Postwar economic growth is usually driven by the bridging of the gap with prewar 
levels of GDP and GDP per capita. In the early postwar period, a postwar 
‘reconstruction boom’ is expected and later growth performance depends on economic 
                                                 
5  In addition, the momentum of future projects was still high. In the end of 1997, US$1.5 billion worth 
of projects were in preparation (Wetter 1999).    6
policy and structural change. The early period can be dubbed as a reconstruction-led 
boom while later periods may combine reconstruction residuals or the effect of 
structural reforms undertaken in the postwar period with the prime example being the 
German and Japanese miracles. A postwar reconstruction boom is usually transitory and 
can be explained by neoclassical growth theory. During wars, capital is destroyed and 
hence the economy starts off the postwar period with lower than capital-to-labour ratio 
than the long run equilibrium. Hence convergence necessitates that the economy grows 
at a higher rate than the equilibrium growth rate in a ‘closing the gap’ dynamics. Hence, 
this disequilibrium phenomenon leads to a postwar reconstruction boom that causes 
growth rates to reach prewar levels (Smolny 2000; Eichengreen 1995). Using such 
methodology, the period 1945-50 can be seen as the period of reconstruction in Europe. 
In this respect, rapid postwar growth not only bridges the gap with prewar output but 
also can be a source for asset and income redistribution policies that alleviate poverty, 
inequalities and provide the distributional basis of a new social contract (Addison and 
Murshed 2001). Moreover, Smolny (2000) has also shown that the economic conditions 
of growth, investment and increased demand in the reconstruction period had a positive 
effect on growth in the 1950-60 period in Europe. For example, in the postwar period in 
Europe, the reconstruction period formally ended in 1950 as the sigma convergence, the 
measure of dispersion between output per capita, between European economies to the 
prewar levels was achieved (UNECE 2000). In a study on Germany’s postwar growth 
and reconstruction Reichel (2002) has shown that the postwar economy in Germany 
experienced not only a reconstruction boom but a sustained economic growth that 
characterized what became to be known as the ‘economic miracle’ or 
Wirstscahftswunder. The German economy in the 1950s and 1960s experienced above 
average growth rates which cannot be explained by the catching up dynamics which 
should have by the 1950s produced declining rates of growth. Two hypotheses emerge 
concerning the lasting effect of the reconstruction growth on the post-1950 period 
(Carlin 1996). First, rapid investment was caused by a disproportionality between 
physical and human capital stocks. Germany emerged from the war with high human to 
physical capital stocks which maintained higher than normal returns on investment even 
in the post-1950 period. The second hypothesis based on Olson (1982) distributional 
coalitions theory argues that the Second World War destroyed growth inhibiting 
coalitions. Moreover, institutional reform was instrumental in creating the right 
conditions for sustained economic growth. In terms of institutions, the Marshal plan and 
the currency reform of 1948 in Germany created the conditions for the postwar recovery 
to take hold. The currency reform had both distributional and productive impacts. The 
cancellation of enterprise and government debt led to a redistribution from holders of 
financial assets to the holders of real assets. In addition, the currency reform, led to the 
elimination of ‘repressed inflation’ – a phenomenon lasting from 1945-48 as result of 
the growth in non-market activities and the hoarding of goods and labour. The German 
economy then experienced a remarkable increase in the supply of labour and goods 
(Carlin 1996). The Japanese experience tells a similar story. The reconstruction phase in 
Japan lasted until 1954 when prewar GDP and GDP per capita levels were achieved. 
The subsequent growth in the 1950s and 1960s can be also attributed to the egalitarian 
and anti-monopolistic reforms implemented by the American occupation authorities 
(Ishi 1999).   7
2.1.2 Postwar growth in Lebanon 
To get a picture of where the Lebanese economy stands today relative to the prewar 
period in terms of catching up with prewar output levels, Figure 1 shows the logged real 
GDP per capita for Lebanon from 1970 to 2003. It is striking that despite a return to 
economic growth in the postwar period after 1992, Lebanon is still lagging behind the 
per capita income reached before the war. In year 2003, GDP per capita was US$1715 
in 1990 constant dollars compared with US$3308 at the eve of the war in 1974.  
 
Figure 1 





In Table 3, the postwar growth rate of GDP and GDP per capita is shown for Lebanon. 
For comparison, available data from Germany are also presented. The growth 
performance in postwar Lebanon is dismal when compared with predictions by 
neoclassical growth theory and the performance of European postwar economies. In 
contrast, the growth slowdown in postwar continental European economies occurred in 
the early 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreements and the first oil 
shock (Ben-David and Papell 1998).  
The postwar anemic growth was also accompanied by an investment and consumption 
slowdown during the period of crisis. The role of investment in postwar economics 
cannot be overemphasized. Many attribute the super growth of the European post-
Second World War growth to the high levels of investment in the postwar period. In 
Lebanon, the record of postwar investment is dismal even when compared with 
economies that are in their normal state of affairs. The average annual growth of gross 
domestic investment was -5.5 per cent in the period 1993-2003 (World Bank Database). 
Figure 2 shows yearly gross capital formation in the postwar period. The failure of the 
Lebanese economy to experience high growth rates and the slump in capital formation 
in the reconstruction period rendered the prospects for long term growth less favourable. 
Figure 3 shows that private consumption experienced a slump in the post-1998 period. 
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Table 3 
Economic growth in postwar Lebanon 
Year  Lebanon (1992-2001) real 
GDP growth 
Lebanon (1992-2001) RGDP 
per capita growth 
Germany (income per 
capita growth) 
1 4.5  1.5   
2 7  3.4  9.9 
3 8  4.6  14.3 
4 6.5  3.4  13.3 
5 4  1.5  16.2 
6 3.5  1.3   
7 3  1.1   
8 4  2.2   
9 2  0.25   
10 1.4  -0.27   
Source:   For Lebanon GDP, UN estimates from UNCDB. For RGDP per capita for Lebanon, 
calculations by author from data on nominal per capita GDP and GDP deflator 
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Figure 3 
Private consumption in postwar Lebanon (1990-2002). 
 
Source: UNCDB. 
2.2 Distributional  effects 
Addison  et al. (2004) discuss the importance of fiscal policy in post-conflict 
reconstruction in generating economic growth and alleviating distributional inequities 
and poverty. Although, the authors discuss specifically low-income countries that have 
experienced civil conflict in the 1990s, their discussion of the need to go beyond the 
traditional goals of fiscal policy in macroeconomic adjustment and stabilization and to 
direct resources towards the alleviation of poverty an inequality has relevance for the 
Lebanese context. The impact of the massive expenditures programme of Horizon 2000 
on social welfare is very difficult to quantify. However, the possible benefits to the poor 
can be divided into two parts. First, the direct benefit that comes from the outlays on 
social sectors such as schooling and health which amounts to around 27 per cent of total 
investments. Second, the effect of reduction in costs of production both in the private 
sector and public sector as a result of investment in infrastructure (roads, electricity, 
water, etc.). Infrastructure investment has been shown to reduce the costs of providing 
services of electricity and water and other public utilities (World Bank 1994). This 
reduction will reflect itself in lower prices and/or in the reduction of deficits of public 
utilities which eventually will result, given appropriate fiscal policies, in the reallocation 
of resources towards useful social expenditures. Also of importance to the Lebanese 
case is the reduction of production costs in the private sector, as it is estimated that 
electricity and transportation costs form a major component of production costs in the 
Lebanese industry and given an oligopolistic industrial structures is usually passed on to 
consumers in mark-up pricing. Moreover, regional investment expenditures and current 
expenditures on health, education have a significant welfare impact. The reconstruction 
programme in Lebanon did attempt a form of redistribution but that was based on 
regional redistribution. This regional redistribution encoded under the necessity the 
achievement of ‘balanced development’ in the Taef Accords and hence in the new 
constitution of Lebanon, was reflected in the Horizon 2000 plan. Table 4 shows the 
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Table 4 
Regional shares of investment in Horizon 2000 plan 
Region Beirut  Beirut 
Suburbs 




14 20 19  18  14  15 
Source: UNDP (1997).  
 
This type of regional redistribution was complemented with the creation of two main 
funds, the Council of the South which channeled development aid to the South of 
Lebanon and the Displaced Fund which was entrusted with the resource allocation for 
return of war refugees to their previous dwellings mainly in Mount Lebanon. Such 
redistributional mechanisms played a very important role in the rebuilding of the 
physical, political and social capacities of regions and the reintegration of the 
population and the legitimization of the postwar authority. However, regional and 
sectarian redistribution in the postwar period came at the expense of the distribution 
along income groups. The civil war as mentioned earlier had a severe negative 
distributional impact. The postwar economic strategy ignored such a distributional 
channel. This was reflected mainly in the tax structure that was built in the postwar 
period. The taxation structure was initially reformed in a typical supply side fashion 
which reduced income and profit marginal tax rates. The top marginal tax rate on profits 
was reduced from 50 per cent to 10 per cent. The top marginal tax rate on wages was 
reduced from 32 per cent to 10 per cent. The corporations tax rate became a flat 10 per 
cent. In addition, and as the fiscal crisis of the state intensified, indirect taxes became 
the main vehicle for state revenues. The continuous increase in indirect taxes (especially 
the gasoline tax) and the imposition of the value added tax (VAT) in 2001 have led to a 
tax system in postwar Lebanon that was highly regressive (Dibeh 2003a). Such a 
regressive tax system was seen as a major cause of the hardships faced by the majority 
of the population in the crisis period. The tax system was increasingly used for revenue 
generation with no regard to the distributional impact. Moreover, the intensification of 
the fiscal crisis of the state led to the abandonment of most of the social dimensions of 
the reconstruction plan. The state fiscal and economic functions were reduced by 1998 
to revenue generation. In addition, contrary to many expectations, the state used the new 
assets generated by the reconstruction programme (electricity, fixed telephone, cellular 
network) to generate revenues. Consumer welfare considerations, an issue of concern 
for such utilities, were not even considered. In order to get a picture of the social 
welfare in postwar Lebanon, Table 5 presents relevant MDGs for the period. The MDGs 
were chosen based on the availability of data and their relevance to welfare implications 
(UNDP 2003). 
   11
Table 5 
Selected MDG statistics for postwar Lebanon 
Year HDI Gini  MDG-1
(%) 
MDG-2 MDG-3 MDG-4 MDG-5  Below 
poverty 
line (%) 
1990 0.673 0.55 
(1960) 
      










2000 0.752      98.3  100  35  95.3   
2002  0.758         
 
MDG-1: poverty measure of percentage of people living with under US$1.3 per day. MDG-2: 
primary net enrolment rates. MDG-3: proportion of girls to boys in primary education. MDG-4: 
Under five mortality rate. MDG-5: proportion of students who have completed grade 5. 
Sources: for MDG, UNDP (2003) and for HDI, UNDP (2004). For Gini for year 1960, WIDER 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID). For Gini for year 1998, Administration Centrale de La 
Statistique (1997) Conditions de Vie des Ménages en 1997, Republique Libanaise, Beirut. 
3  Fiscal policy in the postwar period 
Fiscal policy in the postwar period was driven by three factors. First, the economic 
reconstruction plan necessitated huge expenditures on infrastructure development. 
Second, the necessity of state building engendered huge expenditures on the military, 
security and administrative apparatus of the state. Third, the post-Taef Accord sectarian 
politics and the diffusion of the political power between the different sects as 
represented by the collective executive authority vested in the council of ministers has 
led to a massive distributive and rent seeking predatory activities by the representatives 
of the different sects in the postwar period. Demands on public resources and 
employment became the two main vehicles for such distributive politics. Prime Minister 
Hariri having crafted the Horizon 2000 plan understood the tremendous danger to his 
reconstruction effort of such huge claims on the public budget. However, the initial plan 
to conduct a fiscal adjustment failed. After an initial attempt at reducing the deficit in 
1993, the government abandoned such an effort in 1994 and 1995. The deficit to GDP 
ratio, after an initial drop in 1993, went back its pre-1992 levels. This shows that the 
Hariri government was unable to implement fiscal adjustment. The government chose 
instead to rely on a restrictive monetary policy and substituted bond-financing of 
deficits for inflationary finance which was the norm in the 1980s. This resulted in a 
growth of government debt in the postwar period. A major component of public 
expenditures growth was the growth of the share of public wages as percentage of 
government expenditures. Table 6 shows the explosion of debt during the reconstruction 
period.    12
Table 6 
Evolution of deficits and debt in postwar Lebanon 









Source: Dibeh (2003a). 
 
It is worth mentioning that postwar Lebanon registered one of the highest deficit to 
GDP and debt to GDP ratios in the world showing the intensity of the fiscal crisis of the 
state in the postwar period. This fiscal crisis of the state felt at the political level in 1998 
put increasing pressures on the state to abandon its expansionary fiscal policy. The 
peace dividend was brought to an end as austerity measures were implemented during 
the Hoss government that lasted from 1998 to 2000. 
In this respect, it can be said the question of the peace dividend in postwar Lebanon has 
a certain complexity to it. In all post conflict societies a peace dividend is generally 
expected by the population as the conflict dies down and military expenditures are 
reduced and the demands of the various sectors of the population are expected to be met 
(Addison and Ndikumana 2003). In postwar Lebanon, the peace dividend was coupled 
with high military expenditures and the growth of public debt. Public expenditures in 
Lebanon were high on both the military, health, education, the displaced and public 
wages. Table 7 shows the share of different sectors of public expenditures in selected 
years in the period up to 1998.6 The military and security expenditures were mainly on 
wages and benefits. The percentage allocated to personnel expenditures rises as the 
regime takes hold and the early higher expenditures on physical installations and 
equipment level off. 
 
                                                 
6  The military and security forces also received sizeable pensions and retirement indemnities in the 
postwar period. For example, in the period 2001-03, the security and military personnel received 
around 70 per cent of all pensions and indemnities distributed by the government to public employees 
totalling for the three years approximately US$1.8 billion (II Monthly 2003).   13
Table 7 
Shares of different sectors of public expenditures (in billions LP) 
 1994  1995  1998 
Military and security  900  1011  1216 
Health 269  349  476 
Education 530  702  957 
Displaced fund  260  265  140 
Public wages  1710  1869  2352 
South Council  126  134  74 
Sources: For military expenditures, II Monthly, August 2002. For health, education and public wages, 
Dibeh (2003a). For South Council and Displaced Fund, Ministry of Finance. 
 
The percentage of expenditures on personnel rises from around 74 per cent in 1994 to a 
staggering 90 per cent in 2002 (II Monthly, August 2002). The expenditures/taxation 
system allowed for a non-sustainable social contract. The growth of debt, debt service 
and fiscal crisis of the state caused the diversion of resources away from reconstruction 
and social expenditures and caused high real interest rates that caused the cyclical 
downturn in 1998 (Dibeh 2003b).  
4  Monetary policy and central banking 
The role played by monetary policy and the central bank in the postwar period was all 
important in ending the reconstruction boom and in engendering a finance-biased rentier 
economy in the longer run. The monetary policy main objectives were financial stability 
and the maintenance of capital inflows. Financial stability was achieved through 
currency stability using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in the postwar 
stabilization. The political economy of such a policy bias reveals the congruence of 
interests between the state and commercial banks in conducting such a policy. The 
central bank, as an institution that historically was subsumed to the interests of the 
banking sector, was instrumental in mediating between the interests of the state and the 
interest of commercial banks. In contrast to the experience of many central banks in 
civil wars (Addison et al. 2001), Lebanon’s central bank maintained its status and 
functions throughout the civil war period. In this context, the role of the central bank of 
Lebanon in the postwar reconstruction period becomes an important element of the 
institutional nexus and the political economy of that period.7 Its policy caused a 
                                                 
7  The literature on the role of the central bank in economic development and the political economy of 
central banking can provide great insight into the role of such an institution in post-conflict 
reconstruction. In a recent paper, Epstein (2005) has argued that central banks have historically played 
an important role in the economic development of advanced capitalist economies mainly in the US, 
Britain, France and Germany. The recent consensus on central banks as inflation-fighters is not 
substantiated by the history of central banks. Moreover, in developing countries such as Mexico and 
Brazil, the central bank has played an allocative role in credit channelling towards sectors that are 
earmarked for growth hence playing an active role as an agent of economic development. Moreover, 
politics and institutions play a role in the determination of monetary policy and inflation-bias in both 
developed and developing countries. Epstein (1992) has shown that four factors: capital-labour   14
contradiction between stabilization and reconstruction and that contradiction was 
resolved at the expense of reconstruction. Nasser Saidi, vice governor of the BdL from 
1993-2003, said clearly that  
Monetary policy should aim to control inflation through control of 
money growth. The Central Bank should not become a reconstruction or 
development bank. (Saidi 1999) 
The central bank hence conducted an industrial policy of reviving and developing the 
banking sector. The banking sector emerged from the war largely unscathed despite the 
bank failures of the 1980s that mainly hit small banks speculating heavily in foreign 
exchange markets. The banking system, however, had very poor capital adequacy ratios. 
The policy of the central bank of high interest rates and its conduct of the Lebanese 
Treasury bills (T-bills) auction market allowed banks to make super profits in the period 
1993-97 when the cumulative premium on Lebanese T-bills over foreign denominated 
Eurobonds reached around 54 per cent which to many was seen as the central bank’s 
policy of propping up commercial banks with low adequacy ratios in an overcrowded 
banking sector (Hakim and Andary 1997).8 This interest rate policy caused major shock 
to the economy as a result of the high level of real interest rates generated. The 
industrial sector suffered heavily. By 1997, it was obvious that high interest rates and 
real exchange rate appreciation were causing a loss of competitiveness and a drop in 
tradeable sector activity (Bolbol 1999). 
The commercial banks and the state were two players in a sustainable game. This is not 
the first time that the banks played a political-economic role. During the civil war, 
commercial banks, by rolling-over debt during times where the probability of repayment 
was very low and currency depreciation wiped out asset values, held the political elite 
together (Henry 1987). The postwar game in the period 1993-98 was all profitable for 
the commercial banks. The probability of default was very low, the opportunity cost of 
capita was low for lack of other investment opportunities and the probability of 
                                                                                                                                               
relations, connections between industry and finance, the position of the economy with respect to the 
world economy and the position of the central bank relative to the state determine monetary policy in 
capitalist economies determine the policy-bias of the central bank. In countries where finance and 
industry are integrated, monetary policy is looser and more conducive to growth than in countries 
where finance and industry are separated. Maxfield (1998) argues that in developing countries the 
international dimension to the politics of central bank independence and currency values is significant. 
The international framework analyzes the impact of the need for international creditworthiness and 
balance of payments equilibrium on the domestic politics of the different sectoral groups and the 
government in relation to the degree of independence of the central bank. Discussing several cases of 
central bank independence in developing countries, Maxfield (1998) reaches the conclusion that the 
more the countries’ need for capital inflows and foreign investment, the higher is the push by the 
financial sector and the government for an independent central bank.  
8  One reason Hakim and Andary (1997) give for high interest rates during this period is the auction 
mechanism adopted by the central bank. The auction shielded the market from competition by foreign 
investors by committing to fulfill all foreign demand for T-bills regardless of size or interest rate even 
if such a demand exceeded the financing needs of the government.    15
depreciation was also very low.9 It allowed commercial banks to transform the huge 
growth in deposits into lucrative, stable and relatively safe investments in Lebanese  
T-bills. Later starting in 1998, and as the specter of currency collapse loomed, 
commercial banks pressured the government to issue foreign currency denominated 
Eurobonds. This allowed commercial banks to adjust their balance sheets. The balance 
sheets were becoming too vulnerable for currency depreciation which would have 
caused a twin currency-banking crisis. The increase in Eurobond issue coincided with 
the entering of Lebanon into recession, new political regime and structural crisis. This 
policy did not constitute a refusal to finance the state, an act that would have caused the 
twin crisis. The optimal decision for the banks was to continue to finance the state but in 
foreign denominations. This special relationship between the banks and the state 
mediated by the central bank was instrumental in the prevention of state default or 
currency crisis. In an IMF study on the debt-generated financial vulnerabilities in 
emerging markets, IMF (2004) concluded that ‘Lebanon has defied pessimistic 
predictions, including those of the Fund, and a debt crisis has been avoided. While 
investor confidence plays a role in any emerging market economy, in Lebanon it has 
become the linchpin of a unique symbiosis between the public-sector and the banking-
sector balance sheets and how the authorities used this to overcome the near roll-over 
crisis of 2001-2002’.  
The state-commercial bank collusion reached heightened levels during the Paris II 
negotiations with the declared commitment of commercial banks to buy US$2 billion of 
Eurobonds at zero coupon rates as the banks’ contribution to the alleviation of the fiscal 
crisis of the state. In addition, the strong banking-central bank-state collusion made 
Lebanon immune to the emerging markets crisis in 1998. The spreads on the Eurobonds 
held steady. This was caused by the fact that the commercial banks of Lebanon were the 
largest holders of Eurobond issue by the government. Table 8 shows the evolution of 
Lebanese denominated and foreign denominated government bonds held by commercial 
banks.  
Table 8 
The evolution of government bonds held by commercial banks 




4013 6825 7641 11480 12208 14788 17294 16828 13905 16213 13509 11293 
Eurobonds 
(billion LP) 
0  80  251 474  917  3008 4205 5675 8246 10309  9595 11075 
Source: For years 1993-98, Nahas (2003). For years 1999-2004, Association of Banks in Lebanon Annual 
Report 2003-2004. 
                                                 







 where p = probability of repayment, r = discount rate (or opportunity cost of 
capital), i = interest rate on debt and d = expected depreciation rate. In the postwar period, p was high, 
r was low, i was high and d was low all factors that ensure the above inequality.    16
In this respect, one of the major outcomes of this state-central bank-commercial banks 
collusion was the extraordinarily stability of the Lebanese pound (LP) which hovered 
around 1500 since September 1993. The Lebanese pound has withstood severe 
pressures and predictions of an impending currency crisis. This political-economic 
nexus has defended a currency that otherwise would have been indefensible. Table 9 
shows major episodes of intervention by the central bank in the defense of the currency. 
Table 9 
Central bank intervention in support of Lebanese Pound (1993-2005) 
Period Events  Central  bank  intervention 
February 2005   Assassination of Rafic Hariri  Yes – Market  
September 2004  Hariri resignation  Yes – Market (US$2 bn) between October and 
November 
2001  - Increased dollarization rate 
- Long dollar speculative positions 
- IMF 2001 report calls for 
devaluation of the LP 
Yes – Central bank bought directly T-bills issued 
by government denominated in LP 
2001  High debt/structural crisis  Increased reserve requirements 
Market intervention (US$2 billion with US$1 bn 
in February-April 2001) 
Deposits solicited by Hariri form Arab 
governments totalling ~ US$1 billion) 
US$1 billion loan of which US$500 million went 
to boost central bank reserves. 
1998  Government crisis  Central bank sent strong signals of no intent of 
devaluation 
1997  - Speculative activity 
- First signs of uneasiness of 
markets given mounting deficit and 
debt 
- Hariri plan to raise taxes rejected 
by government in September 
- Central bank market intervention ~ US$1.5 
billion 
- Saudi deposit of US$600 million at the central 
bank 
1995-96  Renewal for president Hrawi  Central bank increased yields on T-bills to 40% 
1994 (end of 
year) 
Hariri threat to resign  Central bank increased drastically interest rates 
Source: Compiled by author from various sources and news bulletins.  
In addition to the finance-biased policy of the central bank, capital inflows of various 
kinds (foreign capital flows, remittances and overseas development assistance (ODA)) 
further skewed Lebanon’s postwar economy towards a finance-biased development. 
Such development caused the crowding-out of private investment and hence was 
instrumental in the failure of the Horizon 2000 plan which relied on a three to one ratio 
of private to public investments. ODA in postwar Lebanon was high when compared 
with ODA in post-conflict low-income states in sub-Saharan Africa when measured on   17
a per capita basis but highly insignificant if measured in terms of GDP or reconstruction 
requirements (see Table 10). Moreover, the role of foreign aid was largely political in 
that it caused a national reliance on the rest of the world to prevent economic crisis and 
currency collapse (e.g. Paris II and foreign deposits at the central bank). In Lebanon 
actualized and promised foreign aid have played such a role in the postwar period. The 
Hariri governments always trumpeted the willingness of donors in the Arab world and 
elsewhere to provide Lebanon with financial assistance. Meetings held outside Lebanon 
with the purpose of aid provision were numerous which included the sums promised by 
Arab states during the Taef Accords signature, the Friends of Lebanon conference in 
Washington in 1997, the Paris I meeting and finally Paris II meetings in 2002. This was 
complemented by the willingness of friendly governments to purchase Eurobond issues 
such as Malaysia and the Gulf States and to deposit funds for the beefing up of foreign 
reserves at the central bank. Moreover, such foreign aid (and in many instances just 
promises of aid) had a significant impact on the fiscal stance of the government. This 
provided incentives for the postponing of reforms needed to avert the fiscal crisis of the 
state that developed. Such behaviour is in agreement with the role of ODA in affecting 
the fiscal stance of governments in the developing world and in post conflict societies 
studied by McGillivray and Morrissey (2004). 
Emigrant remittances, on the other hand, have always played a role in the Lebanese 
economy through financing part of the chronic trade deficit and were a much larger 
inflow than foreign aid during the postwar period. The IMF estimates put the emigrant 
remittances at around US$2.5 billion averaged over the period 1993-2002 and Lebanon 
is the third highest country of remittances to GDP ratios (IMF 2005). These capital 
inflows, remittances, ODA and occasional Arab deposits reinforced the central bank’s 
policy of financial and currency stability and helped in the creation of a nonproductive 
rentier economy. The rentier income from interest payments on deposits and T-bill 
subscriptions and bank profits plus ODA; remittances and foreign capital flows became 
a fetter in production as high real interest rates and real exchange rate appreciation 
suffocated the industrial sector. The process of deindustrialization in the postwar period 
was significant underlying a sort of Dutch disease phenomenon and shifted the economy 
towards commerce and the production of non-tradeables. The average annual rate of 
growth for industry in the postwar period form 1993-2003 was -0.4 per cent while for 




ODA in Postwar Lebanon 
 Lebanon  Rwanda  Angola  Eritrea  Ethiopia  Mozambique
Per capita 
ODA (US$) 
50 110  (1995)  27.9  40.8 10.6  61.3 
Source: Lebanon: UNCDB. Rwanda: Ndikumana (2003). Others: Addison and Ndikumana (2003).  
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Table 11 
Indicator of rentier income in Lebanon 1995-2000 (in billion LP) 
  1995 1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 
Banks’  profits  286 487  655  758 658 556 
Interest  on  T-bills  561 695  735  825 842 871 
Total  847  1182  1390  1583 1500 1427 
%  of  GDP  4.7 5.8  6.1  6.5 6.1 5.7 
Source:   For bank profits in 1995, II Monthly March 2003. For 1996-2002, AUDI Bank Country and Market 
Update 2004.  
 
To assess the importance of rentier income, an approximate calculation of the trend of 
such an income is presented. Rentier income is defined as commercial banks profits plus 
income derived from holding financial assets. Central banks can increase rentier income 
in the economy by raising real interest rates and lowering inflation (Epstein 2001)   
and in the 1980s and 1990s there has been a secular rise in the GDP share of rentier 
income in many industrialized countries (Epstein and Power 2003). Expansionary fiscal 
policy raised interest rates and increased the amount of interest payments from the 
government to rentiers. The insistence of the central bank on maintaining currency 
stability also maintained rentier income.10 Table 11 shows the trend for an indicator of 
rentier income share for Lebanon for the years. Due to lack of proper national accounts 
in Lebanon, the approximate rentier income was calculated as equal to profits of 
commercial banks plus interest paid on T-bills held by the public. This of course grossly 
understates rentier income. However, the trend clearly shows an upward trend.11  
The return on equity (ROE) of commercial reached very high levels in the period 1995-
2000 compared to ROEs in the Middle East and in emerging markets. The asset to GDP 
ratio reached 332 per cent in 2003 compared with 101 per cent for the Middle East and 
123 per cent for emerging markets (AUDI 2004). It is such super profits of the banking 
sector and the high rentier income share that formed the broad political-economic 
support for the policies conducted by the central bank that created a finance and 
services-biased economy.12 
 
                                                 
10 Epstein and Power (2003) have shown that in many semi-industrialized countries such as Mexico and 
Turkey, financial crisis caused rentier income to decrease.  
11 Although data is available for interest income for Lebanon for 1997 (National Income Accounts for 
Lebanon 1997, Ministry of Economy and Trade), a cross country comparison cannot be done because 
of different accounting, institutional and valuation methods in different countries and hence trend 
analysis signifies how such a variable moves through time in a given country (see Epstein et al. 2003). 
12 Addison and Murshed (2001) have considered various possible outcomes for postwar economies in 
terms of the relative output of agriculture and services sectors. A relative price shift in favour of 
services can cause the economy to be S-biased and hence growth will be less likely to be poverty 
reducing.   19
5  Postwar political reconstruction: cooperation and conflict 
The end of civil wars and postwar reconstruction is not limited to the economic sphere. 
Political and institutional change plays a crucial role in ending civil wars and in the 
modalities of postwar reconstruction. Hartzell (1999) studied negotiated settlements in 
38 civil wars in the post-Second World War era and showed that the security dilemma 
presented by civil conflict necessitates power sharing institutions that solve such a 
problem through the use of coercive force, the distribution of political power and the 
distribution of resources.  
Lebanon’s Taef Accord, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was a model example of 
such power sharing arrangements. The Taef Accords were signed in October 1989 in the 
Saudi resort city of Taef by Lebanese parliamentarians and the major warring factions. 
The Taef Accords provided the political and constitutional basis for a new post-conflict 
consensus between the different sects of Lebanon. It signalled the birth of what came to 
be known as the Second Republic. The necessities of political reconstruction and the 
redistributional content of the Taef Accords added a political economic dimension to the 
nexus of economic policies implemented in the postwar period and the finance-biased 
monetary and central bank policies. The fiscal crisis of the state intensified as a result of 
the military and security expenditures, demands by regions and sects for resources and 
the usage of public employment as a vehicle of social welfare.  
The war has destroyed the hegemonistic role of the Maronites who in the prewar period 
held the all powerful presidency and army leadership under their control. The Taef 
Accords stripped power from the Maronites and redistributed it to the other sects 
through transferring the executive powers of the Maronite president to the collective 
institution of the council of ministers. The council was supposed to be the political 
space where the sects and to a minor effect political parties play out their cooperation 
and conflicts. However, such an arrangement or new form of consociational democracy 
was not self-propelled as Syrian hegemony in postwar Lebanon has played a role in the 
mediation and prevention of conflict between the different sects. Wantchekon (2000) 
gives Syrian hegemony the role of enforcement mechanism for the power sharing 
agreement between the sectarian elites that ended political instability and such 
mechanism ensured stability despite the unfairness of the Taef Accord to the 
Maronites.13 The postwar political arrangement represented a form of tackling the 
                                                 
13 As in many countries that have experienced civil conflict, the signing of the Taef Accords in 1989 did 
not bring an instantaneous end to the civil war in Lebanon, with an intra-Christian confrontation 
between the supporters and opponents of the Accords. General Michel Aoun, the Lebanese army 
commander, declared his opposition to the Accords knowing that they legitimized Syrian hegemony in 
Lebanon. In what was described as ‘conflict among former allies’ (Atlas and Licklider 1999), forces 
led by Aoun attacked the Christian militia, the Lebanese Forces, and the fighting ended in a ceasefire 
in May 1990. The Aoun rebellion against the pro-Syrian government, the Taef Accords and Christian 
militias ended in October 1990 when Syrian forces attacked his positions and he was ousted and 
exiled to France. In the period between October 1990 and May 1991 all militias, except Hezbollah, 
handed over their arms to the central government and Lebanon emerged as a unified nation and 
embarked on political reconstruction. The role of the Syrian regime in bringing about the end of the 
civil war was paramount and crucial for the political reconstruction process. In a similar role to that 
played later by the United Nations, NATO, the US and the European Union in bringing an end to civil 
conflicts in Europe, Asia and Africa, the Syrians used coercion and incentive structures for the 
Lebanese to end the war. Winslow (1996) argues that the suppression of the Aoun rebellion signaled 
to all militias the willingness of the Syrians to physically oppress all opposition to the Taef Accords.   20
problem of horizontal inequality that have been a major source of conflict since 
independence in 1943 and played a major role in the eruption of the civil war. It can 
also be seen as the ‘social contract’ that ended the war which is considered a necessary 
requisite for the success of reconstruction in post-conflict societies (Addison and 
Murshed 2001). The reallocation of political power towards greater representation 
especially for the previously marginalized Shiite population was one of the major 
achievements of the Taef Accords and the Second Republic.14 
The Second Republic reinforced sectarian divisions by focusing reform on power 
sharing and redistribution rather than the formation of a secular democratic system 
(Rigby 2000; Ofeish 1999; Hudson 1999). The political settlement of the postwar period 
not only reflected the outcome of the civil war where Syria and its mainly Muslim allies 
gained the upper hand but also reflected the outcome of shifting demographics and even 
economic wealth distribution. The influx of capital from the Gulf mainly through Sunni 
channels was already shifting the sectarian distribution of commercial bank ownership 
in the 1980s. Henry (1987) provides evidence that shows that while in 1974, Christians 
controlled 62 per cent of the total capital of the top 15 banks while Muslims controlled 
18 per cent, by 1982 the ownership structure has changed to 32 per cent Christian versus 
33 per cent for Muslims. Although there is no evidence on ownership shares by the end 
of the civil war and during the reconstruction period, it is highly probable that such a 
trend continued. Moreover, the incursion of Muslims into traditionally held wealth 
spaces held by Christians was also extended to the commercial and service sector. In 
2002, the law of exclusive dealerships, a hallmark of Lebanese capitalism since the 
prewar period, was up for scrapping by the parliament. Christian merchants who 
dominated the commanding heights of the import sector opposed such a move which 
prompted a much controversial response by the leading intellectual on the Hariri side to 
lambaste such opposition accusing them of ignoring sectarian wealth distribution shifts 
that has occurred. The sectarian distribution of state funds that took outright and open 
channels included the Shiite dominated Council of the South, the Druze-dominated fund 
for the Displaced and the Sunni-dominated Greater Beirut Public Works Council   
which was later disbanded under the Lahoud regime and its functions relegated to the 
CDR.15 The amounts disbursed in the period 1993 to 2004 reached around US$850 
million for the Council of the South and around US$1.2 billion for the Displaced   
Fund. 
The reconstruction was successful in rebuilding the political and fairly democratic 
institutions in the postwar period. This can be considered one of the major achievements 
of the reconstruction era. The state apparatus, army and security forces were unified 
under one leadership. The prewar parliament was beefed up by appointees and first 
postwar elections were held in 1992. Such achievements, sometimes overlooked by 
some observers, overcame very quickly the divisions of the prolonged civil war which 
witnessed increased fractionalization of the Lebanese society. This achievement must be 
                                                 
14 The question of horizontal inequality among different groups in culturally diverse societies has been 
largely neglected in the development literature. Stewart (2000) considers that horizontal inequality 
should be as important as vertical inequality in the design of development policies because such 
multidimensional inequality that encompasses economic, political and social differentiation have 
severe consequences on individual and social welfare.  
15 Even the CDR was seen by many as dominated by Sunnis (Hudson 1999). The CDR was, until the 
Hoss government came to power in 1998, a haven for Hariri loyalists.    21
contrasted to many countries in Africa (Somalia, Sierra Leone), Asia (Afghanistan) and 
Europe (Bosnia) which witnessed instability, failed states and widespread security 
breakdowns in the post-conflict period.16 Lebanon, in this respect, was successful in 
building the authority of the state in a relatively short period of time. The first president 
in the post-Taef period, Elias Hrawi, did put the maintenance of law and order in the top 
of his administration’s priorities (Rashchka 1993).17 The unification of the armed forces 
under one leadership was considered the first and most important step in the emergence 
of post-conflict Lebanon. Early on, the US government, as one of the protagonists of the 
Taef Accords, did recognize this fact. Edward Djerdjian, Undersecretary of State at the 
time, told the American Task force on Lebanon in 1993 that  
The Lebanese leadership regards the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as a 
key instrument for national reconciliation. The LAF has disarmed most 
of the militias which plagued the land. It has successfully eliminated the 
confessionalism which formerly divided its ranks, an example the 
Lebanese nation could well take to heart. Most significantly, the LAF has 
worked to extend the authority of the central government throughout 
Lebanon’s territory. An institution of national scope, the LAF, under the 
able leadership of Gen. Emile Lahoud, is rightfully earning the respect of 
the Lebanese people. 
US Department of State Dispatch, Washington DC: 18 October 1993, 
4(42): 736. 
The choice between the accumulation of physical and social capital and between 
military expenditures defines the tradeoff embodied in fiscal policy for a narrow-based 
regime in a multiethnic or religious society and incentive structures may push the 
regime to choose a pure security seeking state that causes social capital depletion 
(Ndikumana 2004). However, the imposition of security is also a form of public good 
that the poor also demand in post conflict societies (Addison and Murshed 2001). The 
post-Taef political regime did build upon the unification of the security forces and the 
regain of the authority of the central government. There were three parliamentary 
elections held in Lebanon in the postwar period in 1992, 1996 and 2000.18 The first 
                                                 
16 For Bieber (2000), the composition of Lebanon as a multireligious state versus Bosnian and former 
Yugoslavia as a multinational state helps explain the rise of a Lebanese identity in the post conflict 
period while nationalist tendencies preclude a national identity for Bosnia. Despite the signing of the 
Dayton Agreements, Bosnia failed to produce self-propelling institutional growth and development 
and remains dependent on foreign aid (Cowen and Coyne 2005).  
17 The challenges of the reconstruction of what was dubbed ‘collapsed states’ became a major policy 
objective of the international community in the 1990s in response to major outbreaks of civil conflict 
and wars during this period (Ottaway 2002). The experience of building the post-conflict states in 
Africa, Cambodia, Kosovo and Bosnia lend Ottaway (2002) to consider the challenges of state and 
institutions building as an integral part of the reconstruction programmes. Yannis (2002) emphasizes 
the role of the state as an authority to impose public order in post-conflict societies. 
18 One major element of postwar conflict was the parliamentary electoral laws. The division of the 
districts and the non-proportional representation encoded into the three laws for the elections in 1992, 
1996 and 2000 ensured that the overwhelming majority will be won by pro-Syrian political parties and 
figures. The main opposition to such laws came from the Christian camp that claimed that such 
divisions that parted away with smaller districts adopted before the war misrepresented the Christians   22
parliamentary elections merely two years after the end of the war were marred with a 
widespread Maronite Christian boycott of the elections and to a certain extent Sunni 
Muslim skepticism and indifference causing a 30 per cent electoral turnout, the lowest 
in Lebanese history (Salem 1997). However, the elections of 1996 brought back the 
majority of the Maronites into the electoral system as a more pragmatic and conciliatory 
towards the Syrian political class emerged amongst them. The 1996 elections 
consolidated the Taef regime (Hudson 1999). Moreover, the Sunnis revived politically 
by prime minister Rafic Hariri four-year tenure in office joined in with full force. 
However, the 1996 elections saw heavy handed Syrian interference in designing the 
electoral law, forming candidates’ list and even forming a coalition to downsize the 
increasingly defiant Hezbollah (Usher 1997). The 2000 elections redrew the political 
landscape and set the stage for the political gridlock and crisis that ensued. The 
elections swept Rafic Hariri back into the office of prime minister. His sweeping 
election victory in Beirut came against the direct involvement of the Syrian regime in 
designing electoral districts with the major purpose of preventing an all out victory for 
Hariri against his Sunni adversaries in Beirut (Norton 2000).  
The addressing of the inequalities of sectarian access to political and administrative 
spaces was also accompanied by a regional investment and expenditures policies that 
aimed at some form of ‘balanced development’. However, such sectarian power 
reallocation created distributive coalitions that impeded economic growth. In a sense the 
Taef Accords created a reverse Olson-effect in that the war destroyed the coalitions that 
were conducive to economic growth in the prewar period and replaced them with 
growth impeding coalitions (Olson 1982). Olson has argued that one of the main 
reasons for rapid economic growth in postwar periods is that wars devastate growth 
impeding political arrangements. A prime example of that is again the Weimar republic 
in Germany. Distributional conflict can have a negative impact on growth rates in 
postwar reconstruction periods. In Germany the weak growth rates experienced in the 
aftermath of the First World War during the Weimar republic were attributed to the 
profit squeeze generated by class conflict. This conflict led to low growth rates and 
investment rates when compared with both the prewar period and the post-Second 
World War reconstruction period.19 One interesting aspect of postwar political 
economy in Lebanon was the success of the state in destroying the threat to economic 
growth and stability that would have come from the labour movement and class 
struggle. After initial tensions during the early period of reconstruction, the state 
completely neutralized the labour unions by 1997. Wage rigidity was an important 
element of postwar reconstruction. Although labour market data is very lacking in 
Lebanon, the minimum wage freeze since 1996, unprecedented in the history of 
Lebanese wage dynamics, and the systematic attack on labour unions by the continuous 
                                                                                                                                               
in all areas of Lebanon where they were in a clear minority. This contention regarding political 
representation formed one of the main contested terrains between the sects and led to a general state of 
latent conflict. Such latent conflict has even a deeper origin in the Christian belief that despite all 
formal arrangements such as equal parliamentary representation, collective leadership in the council 
of ministers and equal division of top administrative posts, the political power in the postwar period 
was mainly held by the Muslims (Perthes 1997).  
19 In a recent cross-sectional study of determinants of economic growth in postwar contexts in 79 wars, 
Koubi (2005) has found an indirect evidence for Olson’s theory. The intensity and duration of war 
was found to be positively correlated with economic growth, evidence consistent with neoclassical 
growth theory and with Olson’s theory that intense and long wars destroy entrenched coalitions.    23
policy of the marginalization and division of the General Federation of Labour, once an 
all too powerful political an economy player in Lebanon. The ministry of labour which 
has control over labour union licensing, foreign labour permits and resolution of labour 
disputes was allocated throughout the postwar period to one of the most pro-Syrian 
parties, the Baath party and the National Syrian Social Party. Both parties used their 
sphere of influence to severely weaken the labour movement, resist calls for control of 
Syrian labour in Lebanon and profit tremendously from the influx of foreign labour into 
Lebanon through corruption and siphoning of funds. In an unprecedented policy, the 
successive Hariri governments starting in 1995 gave the army a continuous standing 
order to suppress of trade union strikes and demonstrations (Baroudi 1998). The trade 
unions activity reached a peak in 1995-96 with the unions declaring a general strike in 
1996 in their attempt to raise minimum wages and halt the continuing rise in indirect 
taxes. However, the government responded with a heavy-handed approach sending in 
the army to break demonstrations and imposed a curfew in one instance another 
precedent in the history of labour unrest in Lebanon. The increases in wages were seen 
as a threat to the stabilization and reconstruction plans of the postwar period. The labour 
demands were coming in a period where it was obvious to the Hariri government that 
the financial and resource burdens of reconstruction were weighing heavily on 
government finances. Such anti-labour measures were also seen as a form of 
‘socialization of parts of the reconstruction costs’ (Perthes 1997). In 1997, the 
government engineered a split in the General Federation of Labour and since then the 
unions have been marginalized. As evidence of such marginalization, the government 
has frozen the minimum wage in Lebanon since 1996 and many indirect taxation 
measures with severe distributional effects were passed in the post 1997 period.  
The distributional conflict hence was played in the sectarian space. The mechanisms of 
such conflict were transformed from initial cooperation to conflict played. Initially, the 
necessity of the construction of the state and the transition from the First Republic to the 
Second Republic in which power is diffused led to the enormous expenditures on public 
employment, security apparatus and sectarian targeting. This cooperative phase lasted 
until around 2001. The second phase, witnessed simmering conflict between the sects 
and the beginning of the end for the Second Republic as the fiscal crisis of the state 
intensified and it was apparent to everybody that the postwar model cannot be sustained 
for a long period. It is in this period that the sectarian conflict over the Taef Accords and 
Syrian troop presence intensified which ended with the assassination of Rafic Hariri and 
the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005.  
6 Concluding  remarks 
Reconstruction and development plans and programmes are difficult and complex tasks 
whose success is doubtful even in more coherent post-conflict societies. For example, 
the failure of the African National Congress-inspired Reconstruction and Development 
Plan is a prime example of the complexity of planning economy paths given growth and 
distribution tradeoffs (Blumenfeld 1997). Many lessons from the Lebanese experience 
can guide post-conflict reconstruction in middle to upper-middle income countries 
which experience massive destruction of physical assets. First, the reconstruction boom 
must be complemented with policy reforms and state intervention that would transform 
such a boom into a more sustainable post-reconstruction economic growth. The 
complementarities between reconstruction and the establishment of a developmental   24
state are crucial to the success of reconstruction. The reconstruction process necessitates 
state intervention in the setting of national priorities and control of key sectors. This was 
the experience of post-Second World War reconstruction in Europe and Japan (Van 
Raemdonck and Diehl 1989). In this respect, postwar reconstruction planning must be a 
part of a national development plan with clear macroeconomic and sectoral objectives. 
In the Lebanese experience, reconstruction as planned by the CDR was considered as a 
collection of projects proposed to the council of ministers without social return or cost 
benefit analysis or impact on economic growth and development.20 Infrastructure 
expenditures on large projects produced inefficient results as a result of such ad hoc 
approach to planning public investment projects. The airport, the fixed telephone line 
system and electricity infrastructures are prime examples of such excess capacity 
projects.21 
Second, the success of economic reconstruction and the generation of sustained 
economic growth would allow the state to embark on a process of asset and income 
redistribution. Such redistribution must address the inequalities generated by the years 
of conflict or to ameliorate inequalities that led to the conflict in the first place. Such an 
addressing of horizontal inequities was attempted in Lebanon with some success but it 
came at the expense of vertical inequities that were largely ignored or even solidified. 
However, the growth and cyclical crisis that erupted very early on in the postwar era 
stifled the opportunities for income and asset redistribution with severe and damaging 
political consequences.  
Third, political economy of policy making has a significant impact on the reconstruction 
process. The Lebanese experience shows that economic policy making and institutions 
can create conditions that end the reconstruction boom and even more importantly stifle 
long run economic growth. The right fiscal-monetary policy mix, exchange rate policy 
and interest rate policy are crucial for the success of reconstruction. In Lebanon, such 
elements of economic policy caused a finance-biased economy, a growth cycle and 
deindustrialization. 
Fourth, in multiethnic or multi-confessional societies, political formulas for cooperation 
and the alignment of confessional interests with national political interests and 
economic reconstruction needs must be done. Such an alignment would make 
reconstruction a process which promotes national objectives and dissipates inter-
confessional rent seeking and grabbing activities. The power of the state must be 
utilized to create growth-enhancing distributive coalitions. The lack of national 
involvement in the reconstruction in Lebanon was apparent in all areas related to the 
reconstruction process. In the BCD reconstruction, for example, the middle class and 
citizens did not participate in the development process which involved massive transfer 
                                                 
20 A similar process was followed by the Ministry of Planning in Angola (Aguilar 2003) 
21 The airport capacity is 6 million passengers per year which costs around US$600 million. The 
passenger numbers in 2004 reached only 3 million. The fixed line system capital expenditures planned 
1.7 million lines (with 1.3 million installed in 2002) for a total investment of US$775 million. 
However, the number of subscribers in 2003 reached only 656,000 (II Monthly, January 2004). The 
electricity sector has an installed capacity of 2300 Megawatts at a cost of US$1.8 billion. The 
mismatch between production capacity and transmission capacity caused actual production to be 1350 
megawatts in 2001, while actual power needs are between 1400-1650 megawatts, causing power 
shortages, blackouts and the purchase of electricity from Syria (II Monthly, May 2002).    25
of property rights from around 100,000 claimants to the private company Solidere that 
produced widespread protests (Stewart 1996). These asset transfers coupled with the 
rise of the rentier economy and the confessional contest for different project parcels led 
to an atmosphere of discontent that considered the reconstruction process as a grand 
scheme of contested exchange. In the end, the fiscal crisis of the state ended the material 
basis for such rent seeking activities and provided the economic basis for the political 
conflict that intensified in the post-2000 period. 
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